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Abstract  — This paper identifies and assesses the 
efficiency of major modes for risk governance in 
Bulgarian dairy farming. Firstly, New Institutional 
Economics is incorporated and framework for analyzing 
governance of natural, market, private, and social 
(institutional) risks presented. Next, major types of risks 
faced by the dairy farms are specified and dominant 
market, private, public and hybrid modes of risk 
governance assessed. Finally, principal forms of risks 
caused by the dairy farms are identified, and efficiency 
of governing structure assessed.  
The development of Bulgarian dairy farming has 
been associated with quite specific risk structures facing 
by and causing from this sector. The huge market and 
institutional instability and uncertainty, and the high 
transaction costs, blocked evolution of effective market 
and collective modes for risk protection. A variety of 
private modes (internal organization, vertical 
integration, interlinking) emerged to deal with the 
significant natural, market, private, and social risks 
faced by the dairy farms and the other affected agents. 
Nevertheless, diverse risks associated with the dairy 
farming have not been effectively governed and persist 
during transition now. That is a consequence of 
ineffective public (Government, international assistance) 
intervention to correct market and private sector 
failures in the risk governance. The later have had 
considerable negative impacts on the evolution of farms, 
development of markets, structure of production and 
consumption, state of environment etc. Certain risks 
related to the dairy sector “disappeared” due to the lack 
of effective risk governance and the declining dairy 
farming. That would lead to further deformation in 
development of the dairy and related sectors unless 
effective public measures are taken to mitigate existing 
problems and risks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The post-communist transition and EU integration 
affected profoundly Bulgarian dairy farming. Small-
scale holdings, low productivity, little market-
orientation, non-compliance with quality, 
environmental etc. standards dominate (1). The state 
and prospects of dairy sector is shaped by structure of 
risk and efficiency of risk governance. This paper 
identifies and assesses efficiency of major modes for 
risk governance in Bulgarian dairy farms. It 
incorporates the New Institutional Economics (2, 3, 4, 
5), and presents framework for analyzing risk 
governance. Next, it specifies principal forms of risks 
confronted by and originated from dairy farms and 
evaluates efficiency of dominant governance modes. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Risk related to dairy farms is understood as any 
current or future hazard (event) with significant 
negative impact(s). It could be result of nature and/or 
human activities. Risk could be faced by the dairy 
farm (risk on farm) or caused by the dairy farm (risk 
from farm). Four generic types of risks could be 
specified – natural, market, private, and social. Risk is 
big when there is a great likelihood of risky event to 
occur and that is combined with substantial negative 
consequences. When risk is considerable it is 
associated with significant costs which sometimes are 
hardly expressed in monetary terms. Thus rational 
agents will be interested to invest in risk prevention 
and reduction. 
Risk governance comprises action(s) for reducing or 
eliminating risk and its negative consequences. It 
could be done through improving production 
management but often requires an effective 
governance of relations with other agents - exchange 
of rights, resource coalition, collective actions etc. 
Accordingly, a risk could be governed through market, 
private, public or hybrid mode. Individual forms are 
with unequal efficiency since they have dissimilar 
potential to reduce likelihood and impact of risk, and 
command different costs. The market or collective 
governance has advantages over the internal mode 
since they allow exploration of economies of   2 
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scale/scope in risk assurance and recovery. However, 
risk trading/sharing is often associated with significant 
costs for finding best partners and prices, formulating 
and disputing exchange terms, safeguarding against 
opportunism etc.  
When property rights are not well-defined and/or 
enforced and transaction costs are high the type of 
governance is essential. The internal mode is often 
preferred because of the comparative protective and 
costs advantages. The enormous transaction costs 
could even block the development of insurance market 
or emergence of a collective risk-sharing organization. 
Institutional restrictions could make some governance 
modes impossible
1. Depending on the individuals 
characteristics (risk-aversion, managerial ability etc.), 
and the specific natural, market and institutional 
environment, there will be different efficient forms for 
a particular risk and a governance mix will always 
exist.  
The risk management leads to reduction/removal of 
risk. It is always connected with needs for a trade-off 
between the benefits from reducing risk and related 
governance costs. Effective management of one type 
risk might be associated with exposure to other 
risk/costs. Overall risk exposure is determined by the 
“critical” risk and the integral is rarely sum of 
individual risks. Thus a comparative analysis is to be 
employed to select among the feasible forms the most 
efficient one (s) reducing overall risk to “acceptable” 
level and minimizing total (risk assurance and 
governance) costs.  
Most elements of risk governance are hard to 
quantify. That is why a discrete structural analysis is 
needed to match the risk features (probability, 
significance, acceptance level, needs for collective 
action) with the comparative advantages of alternative 
modes to overcome, reduce, control, share, dispute, 
and minimize costs of that risk. The risk management 
is part of the overall governance of production, 
consumption, and transaction activities of agents (6). 
Thus the total efficiency (advantages, costs-saving and 
risk-minimization potential) of various modes are to 
be taken into account. Since minimization of 
transaction costs is crucial the identification of their 
institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and 
technological factors is essential.     
                                                           
1 Risk assuring monopolies/cartels are usually illegal. 
According to the specific natural, market and 
institutional environment, individuals’ characteristics, 
social preferences etc. various structure of risk 
governance could evolve. In one extreme, the risk 
management system would work well and only 
“normal“(entrepreneurial) risk would be left 
“ungoverned”. Market and private governance may 
fail but an effective public involvement could cure the 
problem. Often needed public intervention is not put in 
place and that affects adversely the farms size and 
sustainability, markets development, evolution of 
production and consumption, state of environment etc. 
 
III. GOVERNING RISKS FOR DAIRY FARMS  
A. Natural risks 
 
Most dairy farms in Bulgaria use traditional 
methods to protect from natural hazards: small-sized 
farm, more sustainable animal and crop varieties, 
appropriate livestock structure, private dogs and 
guards, production diversification, remoteness of 
plots, keeping “emergency fund” etc. 
During much of the transition farms had no access 
to specialized insurance products since they were 
either unavailable or expensive. Agrarian insurance 
market has been developing in last years but it is not 
wide-used (Fig.1). Larger farms have stronger 
incentives to sell the risk because they are highly 
specialized and damages are significant from 
hazardous events. Big enterprises possess financial 
means to insure farm assets, better negotiating position 
for favorable insurance terms (contracting power, 
possibilities to explore scale and/or scope economies, 
on-farm experts). “Purchase of insurance” is explicitly 
requested by banks and public agencies for 
participating in diverse programs. These farms are 
main recipients of such loans/grants and pay 
supplementary price (for insurance supply) to obtain 
the “interlinked” outside funding. 
Most farms can not afford a purchase of risk 
insurance because of the high costs, unfavorable/not-
tailored terms, dissatisfaction from services (disputes 
on terms/extend of harms, delay payment). Insurance 
companies are reluctant to deal with small farms 
because of the miniature size (high transacting costs, 
low profit), and high possibilities for pre-/post-  3 
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contractual opportunism. Consequently, most farming 
resources, activities, and labor are not assured, and 








































Fig. 1, Type of purchased insurance by Bulgarian dairy farms 
Source: interviews, farm managers 
 
Despite potential efficiency (economies of scale 
and/or scope, non-for-profit/members orientation) 
collective modes have not evolved. High transaction 
costs for initiation and development, and conflicting 
interests of different farms impedes that process. 
Public intervention has not been undertaken to assist 
(initiate, legislate) farmers in organization of quasi-
public/quasi-private mode for collective supply of 
insurance.  
In recent years, public control and emergency 
assistance to livestock holdings has been enhanced. 
These measures aim at protecting against significant 
industry/public risk(s) from certain animal diseases. 
Some farms also got public-aid to cover losses from 
natural disasters but that affected larger-operators 
having capacity to deal with bureaucratic procedures. 
Subsequently, most farms do not have proper 
outside (market, collective, public) insurance against 
natural risks and face constantly hazards and damages. 
Affected smaller and middle-size farms experience 
severe looses, and see their assets, scale of operations, 
and welfare further decreased. 
 
B. Market risks 
 
Market risk in dairy farming is mostly associated 
with: high market uncertainty in terms of demand for 
milk, quality requirements, supply of critical inputs; 
huge competition and price fluctuation; 
(semi)monopoly condition in inputs supply and 
marketing; and missing markets situation.  
Unlike natural risk, market-related risk cannot be 
assured by purchase of an insurance. A special 
governance is to be put is place to safeguard farmers’ 
investments.  
The emergence/persistence of a vast subsistence and 
part-time farming has been an effective mode to 
protect household assets and labor in conditions of a 
great institutional and economic uncertainty (1). 
During transition market and contract trade of owned 
capital was either impossible or very expensive 
(“missing” markets, high uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, opportunism, little job opportunities and 
security). There was also a great uncertainty 
associated with the market supply of basic foods in 
terms of costs, stability, quality etc. The internal 
family production was the most effective way of 
protecting and getting return on resources. Similarly, 
missing markets for critical farm inputs and services 
were major reasons for development and sustainability 
of production cooperatives. Big interdependence and 
complementarities of assets, “not-for-profit” and 
membership orientation attracted many small-scale 
farms. Coops evolved as an effective (cheap, stable) 
form of supplying highly specific to farms forage, 
mechanization service, essential inputs, storage, 
processing etc. 
Larger farms integrate entirely the forage supply 
exploring economies of scale and/or scope and 
safeguarding against risk associated with price, 
quality, time of delivery, behavioral uncertainty etc. of 
outside procurement. Our survey demonstrates that all 
commercial farms secure a significant portion of 
needed forage for livestock though an own-production. 
Likewise, they own (rather than rent) dairy animals, 
and all critical assets (milking equipment, barns, 
machineries) are either owned or protected through a 
long-lease contact. Furthermore, a private form to 
govern the bilateral trade between bigger farms and 
processor has been increasingly employed interlinking 
supply of the critical inputs (forage, cooling tanks) 
with the marketing of output (Fig. 2). Later diminishes 
considerably the risk from market inputs supply and 
marketing of output of dairy farms, and increases the 
incentives for productive investments.   4 
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The significant risks from market supply of critical 
labor and services are typically governed through a 
private mode. In dairy farming most managerial and 
technological knowledge and even “relationships” 
with animals are highly farm-specific and extremely 
important for productivity. Therefore, the critical 
activities are secured by the family labor and the 










































Fig. 2, Modes of forage supply in Bulgarian livestock farms 
Source: interviews, farm managers 
 
Most dairy farms report facing significant risks in 
milk marketing. Firstly, price and quality competition 
increases all the time (including cheap import of 
powder milk for processing, consumers goods). Not 
surprisingly all commercial farms want to see the milk 
price augmented in order to allow a modern 
production.  
Secondly, in some regions farmers face monopolies 
experiencing price-discrimination, delayed payments, 
not-fulfillment of contracted terms etc. The individual 
producers can not store fresh milk and/or transport it 
to a long distance (low market appropriability of 
rights, high cite/freshness dependency of dairy farm). 
The incentives to cooperate between competing 
producers and neutralize regional monopolies have 
been low (high transaction costs, opportunism of free-
rider type). 
Third, many smaller-scale dairy farms have been 
entirely ignored by the dominating large processors 
since they are not able to meet quantity and quality 
requirements, and command high transportation, 
training, and transaction costs. These farms have only 
available restricted local fresh-milk market with an 
insignificant demand from minor processors, “street 
market” or direct delivery to individuals. What is 
more, in some milk-producing but remote areas 
farmers experience complete missing market situation. 
 Effective private modes have emerged to deal with 
marketing risks. When high capacity, quality, time of 
delivery, origin etc. dependency with a particular 
buyer is in place then there are strong bilateral 
incentives for integration. Diverse modes for 
marketing arrangements are increasingly applied such 
as long-term delivery contacts, price guarantees, 
premiums, interlinks etc. There are also few good 
examples for collective organizations of marketing 
with effective negotiating and enforcing relationships 
with downstream partners. A prospective mode for 
protection of highly specialized and specific 
investments is organic and eco-production comprises 
merely 5 farms with 722 animals (2007).   
The two associations of dairy producers attracted 
few farms because of the inefficiency in protecting 
producers’ interests with processors and lobbying for 
public support. The sporadic attempts for “collective” 
actions of milk producers (protests, milk poring, 
blocking highways) have given no positive results. 
Consequently, there are huge income variation for the 
different farms, regions, and years, and constant 
reduction in number of farms and animals. 
Public production quotas for cow milk was 
introduced (2007) aiming at diminishing risk from 
income instability. Experience shows that individual 
quotas exceed nationwide (10%) and hardly would 
eliminate the market risks. Thus further diversification 
into the cheep, goat and buffalo productions (where no 
quotas exists) is to be expected. 
 
C. Risks from private agents 
 
The major risks from individuals and private agents 
is associated with: burglaries and other intrusions on 
farm livestock, yields, property; the opportunistic 
behavior(s) in contractual relations with hired labor, 
inputs and service suppliers, buyers of output, 
coalition members; farming or another activity 
adversely affecting dairy holdings (pollution; 
unwanted “security services” etc.). 
There is not an effective public system (police, 
guards, court) for protection and recovery of 
ownership and punishment of offenders. Farmers are   5 
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extremely vulnerable for thieves and organized crimes 
- most farm output and property is “in open”, 
dispersed in wide areas and many locations. The 
permanent risk for agrarian property is widely assured 
by private modes. Our survey found that “costs for 
protection” for all type farms are significant in terms 
of time and resources spent, hired security guards and 
services, “payments for property protection and 
restoration”. The insurance coverage against burglary 
is most used market assurance by the bigger producers 
(Fig.1).  
High transitional uncertainty and insecurity 
(reputation is not important, difficulties to formulate 
and dispute contracts), little contractual experience 
(difficulties to protect interests), impossibility to write 
complete (labor, service) contract in farming and 
dispute terms, high cost for contract enforcement 
through the court system (inefficiency, corruption), are 
responsible for the considerable risk for contractual 
failure
2. Most farm managers consider the “respecting 
laws and private contracts” as one of the most 
important factors for the dairy farms development 
(Fig.3). 
In order to mitigate risk from pre and/or post-
contractual opportunism the private modes are broadly 
employed. Since possibilities for opportunisms are 
great (high information asymmetry, uncertainty, costs 
for supervision and direction) it is typical to use self-
enforced own or family labor for the critical 
operations (1). The operation size in most dairy farms 
is determined by the available household labor. Small 
partnerships are practiced exclusively between 
relatives and friends where costs for coordination, 
decision-making and motivation is low (mutual goals 
and trust govern relations). The large holdings hire 
additional core labor on permanent basis and output-
based compensation, interlinking, social 
disbursements, paid holidays are further used to 
enhance motivation. Similarly, the high-dependency 
from a particular buyer is effectively governed through 
reciprocal (rather than classical) contracts interlinking 
the inputs, and/or credit, and/or extension supply 
against the milk marketing. 
 
                                                           
2 No insurance for protection from “contractual risks” could be 
bought on market. 
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Fig. 3, Most significant factors for development of dairy farms 
Source: survey data, Plovdiv region 
 
The large collective (production, inputs supply, 
marketing, processing) modes are rare because of the 
diversified interests of farmers (different age, unlike 
size and type of operations, extend of diversification 
and market orientation); bad perception of the 
“collective” forms (mismanagement); the huge 
transaction costs for initiation and development; the 
lack of appropriate legislation and incentives for 
association until recently. 
There are situations where dairy farms are badly 
affected by the harmful activities of other farms and 
industries causing pollution or other damages. There 
are cases of conflicts of interests over limited natural 
resources with other agents. Farmers have no means to 
defend against such hazards since appropriate 
legislation is not in place (no farmers rights) or it is 
difficult (costly) to protect or dispute assigned rights 
though the existing forms. The farmers suffer 
considerable damages (on produce yields and quality, 
animal welfare), perform bellow safety and quality 
standards, reduce or cease livestock activities.        
 
D. Institutional risks 
 
The transition has been associated with 
unprecedented changes in the institutional structure. 
There has been a huge uncertainty about directions 
and kind of changes, and instability (dynamics, 
constant amendments, controversies) in rights, 
legislation, regulations, taxation, public organizations, 
authorities responsibilities etc. The public 
administration has been ineffective, incompetent,   6 
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unpredictable, and corrupted. Carrying out farming 
and business in such environment has been associated 
with significant risks and costs for studying, 
complying with, safeguarding from the formal 
regulations and the “informal rules” of bureaucracy. 
Most livestock operation has been carried by 
numerous small-scale and primitive holdings often 
located within residential borders. They contribute 
significantly to air, water and soils pollutions, and 
discomfort of local population. Conflicts between 
farms and neighborhoods are common and bring about 
strong community demand (formal and informal 
pressure) to limit or relocate activities. Carrying out 
livestock activity is risky because of the frictions with 
community and uncertainty about the potential needs 
and costs for adaptation. That particular risk has been 
responsible for the low (investment) incentives for 
modernization which additionally contributed to the 
greater exposure to natural, market, and other 
institutional risks.  
A considerable risk for most dairy farms comes 
from the uncertainty (presently “certainty”) 
surrounding modes of introduction of the CAP. EU 
quality, hygiene, veterinary, environment, animal-
welfare standards are in force (since 2007) and there 
are only 900 farms with 50000 cows meeting EU raw-
milk quality standards (0,5% of the cow-farms and 
13% of the cows in the country (2007). Most holdings 
with milking cows (81%) have no milking installations 
and merely 0.1% of the dairy farms are with safe 
manure pile cites. There is a transition period for the 
adaptation to the new requirements (until 2009) and 
public measures are envisaged to support 
modernization and market orientation of the farms.  
Our survey of commercial dairy farms has found 
out that different type farms have unequal capacity for 
adaptation to the new EU requirements. Most holdings 
have no sufficient potential for adjustment to the new 
institutional requirements (Table 1). That is 
particularly truth for the small-scale unregistered 
producers which dominate in the sector. Only a third 
of the dairy farms believe their production capacity 
corresponds to the modern requirements of 
competition, productivity, eco-performance, and 
animal welfare. Merely one-seventh of them have 
internal capacity or access to outside sources to fund 
necessary investment associated with the adaptation to 
the new norms. Thus, most dairy farms are effectively 
at risk to cease legal commercial activity by 2009. 
Table 1 Farms with big and good capacity for adaptation to 
EU requirements for dairy sector (percent) 
             Farms capacity  Unregi- 
stered 
Firms CoopsT o t a l
Knowledge on new requirements   22.7  63.6  100  38.2 
Available skills and knowledge 
 for adaptation 
 22.7  54.5  100  35.3 
Available production capacity   27.3  45.4    32.3 
Improving quality and hygiene  
standards 
 36.4  72.7  100   50 
Improving animal welfare   31.8  72.7    44.1 
Improving eco-performance   31.8  54.5    38.2 
Finding necessary investment    9.1  27.3    14.7 
Source: survey data, Plovdiv region 
 
A market orientation of the huge (semi)subsistence 
farming is not feasible because of the high costs for 
farm enlargement and adjustment to the new market 
and institutional environment (no entrepreneurial 
capital available, low investment and training 
capability of aged managers etc.). There will be 
technically and politically impossible to enforce the 
official standards in the enormous informal sector. 
Thus no immediate institutional risk for these farms 
exists and they will dominate in years to come.    
 
IV. GOVERNING RISKS FROM DAIRY FARMS 
The major risks to the environment from the dairy 
farms are associated with the pollution of soils and 
waters; the unsustainable use of farmland and 
grasslands; and the significant contribution to 
greenhouse-gas emissions (7). Until recently the 
voluntary initiatives, private organizations, market 
driven modes (e.g. organic farming), and public 
intervention, all had no significant importance for the 
protection of environment and the governing of eco-
risks from dairy farming. The cross-compliance eco-
requirement and a range of public eco-measures are 
introduced with the CAP implementation – eco-
conditionality, eco-standards, eco-regulations, eco-
education, financial support to eco-activities, organic   7 
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farming, zones with eco-difficulties, market-
orientation and diversification of farms etc.  
The livestock farming has been a significant risk to 
the public mostly associated with: the quality, 
authenticity, and safety of livestock products; the 
livestock diseases considerable treat to human health; 
the new public, ethical etc. concerns about 
environment preservation and improvement, animal 
welfare, keeping tradition etc. All that brings to a life 
appropriate policies, regulations and support measures. 
There has been an increasing pressure, control, and 
sanctions on dairy farms both by the processors and 
the state for complying with the new requirements 
(Table 2). Most dairy farms had to make/are being 
undertaking significant changes related to the novel 
institutional requirements in order to sell milk (Fig. 4). 
Surveys show that many of the EU regulations are 
not well-known by the implementing authorities and 
most farmers (7). The lack of readiness and 
experiences would require some time lag until the 
“full” implementation of CAP. Besides, most farm 
managers have no adequate training and managerial 
capability, are old in age with small learning and 
adaptation potential. Therefore, there will be 
significant inequalities in application of the new laws 
and standards in diverse sectors, farms of different 
type and size, and various regions of the country.    
 
Table 2 Control from "Dimitar Madzarov" LTD and state 
on farms (percent) 
            Control on:  "Dimitar Madzarov" LTD State 
Milk quality  94.1  52.9 
Milk safety  47.1  17.6 
Hygiene of production  58.8  44.1 
Animal health  20.6  55.9 
Forage for animals  11.8  35.3 
Care for animals  8.8  35.3 
Care for environment  8.8  41.2 
Control is permanent  2.9  20.6 
Sanctions and  
punishments are applied  38.2 8.8 
Source: survey data, Plovdiv region 
 
Dairy farms pose a considerable risks to other 
farms, individuals, and private agents. There are many 
incidences for using others grasslands/crop yields, or 
otherwise damaging land and property by dairy 
farmers. Some dairy holdings are serious risk for the 
comport of individuals and others businesses (e.g. 
organic farms, recreation/tourism operators, water 
suppliers). These risks are mitigated privately by the 
affected individuals and businesses through 
negotiating, monitoring, employing guards, or 
illegitimate means. 
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Fig. 4, Changes to be made to sell milk to "D.Madzarov"LTD 
Source: survey data, Plovdiv region 
 
The small-scale and semi-subsistence farms have 
been the major milk suppliers to the dairy processors 
putting them in a big (capacity, cite, quality, origin, 
safety) dependency. Divers private modes are broadly 
used by the processors to deal with those risks. We 
have identified an effective system for governing the 
risk in relations of “Dimitar Madzarov” LTD with 
more than 1000 small-scale milk suppliers from 
Plovdiv region. In last 10 years this dairy-processor 
developed a comprehensive system for protection of 
interests, and coordination, stimulation, controlling, 
and conflict resolution with farmers including: 
building a good reputation and trust, constant 
communications, regular group discussions of 
problems, training of farmers in new industry and 
institutional requirements, using written delivery 
contracts, significant relation-specific on-farm 
investments (milk collecting, cooling, and controlling 
facilities and staff), permanent verification of quality 
and registration of delivered milk by each farm, 
punishment for offenders, effective and regular 
payment mode, differential prices stimulating farm 
enlargement and increasing milk-supply, interlinking 
interest-free crediting against marketing of milk,   8 
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providing assistance to farmers in construction and 
preparation public support projects, encouraging farms 
grouping. Namely this special governance has 
contributed considerably for a tighter integration with 
the dairy farms, increasing efficiency of the bilateral 
relations, enhancing farms relation investments, and 
their adaptation to the company’s requirements for 
milk quality and quantity (Fig.5). Involved farms 
consider the development of “Dimitar Madzarov” 
LTD as one of the most important factors for their 
own farm development (Fig. 3). 
The dairy farming has been responsible for great 
risks to markets during transition now. There was 
deficiency in quantity of different type milks during 
market adjustments in first years of transformation. 
Risks of insufficient supply and price volatility were 
successfully overcome by the market (rather than 
failed public) governance – opening-up markets, 
development of market competition and demand etc. 
Up-to-date the risk for consumers associated with the 
authentic quality, safety, origin of milk and dairy 
products is a serious issue.  
The introduction of the EU standards for milk 
production and trade is causing a new risk for 
insufficient supply of local milk. The biggest dairy-
processors are trying to overcome the shortages of 
quality local milk through processing imported 
powder-milk. They increasingly face another 
problem(risk) of low consumer demand for dairy 
products based of non-fresh milk. In order to deal with 
that capacity/quality deficiency risk some processors 
are introducing specific modes for risk governance – 
origin and quality guarantee, brand names, traditional 
and eco-products. The later has brought a variety of 
private modes for governing vertical relations 
backwards with the supplying farmers, and upwards 
with the food chains, retailers, and importers (1).  
A public intervention is also undertaken aiming at 
modernizing and commercializing dairy farms, and 
stimulating production of local and eco-products - 
introduction and protection of rights on traditional and 
organic products, subsidies for modernization of farms 
and adaptation to EU quality and safety standards, 
support for market-orientation, public training and 
advisory services to farmers etc. 
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Fig. 5, Main reasons for selling milk to "D. Madzarov" LTD 
Source: survey data, Plovdiv region  
V. CONCLUSIONS  
Our analysis of the post-communist development of 
dairy farming identified quite specific risk structures 
facing by and causing from this sector of the Bulgarian 
agriculture. The huge market and institutional 
instability and uncertainty, and the high transaction 
costs, blocked evolution of effective market and 
collective modes for risk protection. A great variety of 
private modes (internal organization, vertical 
integration, interlinking) emerged to deal with the 
significant natural, market, private, and institutional 
risks faced by the dairy farms and the affected agents. 
Diverse risks associated with the dairy farming were 
not effectively governed and persist during transition 
now. That was consequence of ineffective public 
(Government, international assistance) intervention to 
correct market and private sector failures in the risk 
governance. The later had considerable negative 
impacts on evolution of (size, productivity, 
sustainability of) farms, development of markets, 
structure of production and consumption, and state of 
environment. Certain risks related to the dairy sector 
“disappeared” due to the ineffective risk governance 
and the declining dairy farming. That would lead to a 
further deformation in development of the dairy and 
related sectors unless effective public measures   9 
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(regulations, assistance, control) are taken to mitigate 
existing problems (risks). 
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